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DUE PROCESS, JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM
AND EFFECTIVE DtATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
ROBERTO IRAOLA*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Broadly speaking, there are three ways to combat international terrorist
2
activity.' The first seeks to prevent a terrorist attack before it takes place.
The second endeavors to contain and manage the terrorist incident as it
occurs. 3 The third responds to a terrorist act after it takes place, typically
by apprehending and prosecuting those involved in the terrorist act or
4
retaliating with military force.
In the case of the bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998, the response included both
criminal prosecutions and military action. 5 Then, on September 11, 2001,
terrorists attacked America's financial and military power centers by hijacking four commercial jetliners and crashing them into the World Trade
Center in New York, the Pentagon in Virginia, and the Pennsylvania
countryside. 6 These horrific attacks resulted in a broad government response. Three days after the assaults, Congress passed a joint resolution
authorizing the use of military force 7 "against those responsible for the...
Senior Legal Advisor to the FBI's General Counsel. J.D., 1983, Catholic University School
of Law. The views herein expressed are solely those of the author and are not intended to reflect
the views of the FBI or the Department of Justice.
1. See Stephen C. Wameck, Note, A Preemptive Strike: Using RICO and the AEDPA to Attack the FinancialStrength of InternationalTerroristOrganizations,78 B.U. L. REV. 177, 178-79
(1998); Irvin B. Nathan & Kenneth I. Juster, Law Enforcement Against InternationalTerrorists:
Use of the RICO Statute, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 553, 554 (1989).
2. See Warneck, supra note 1, at 178; see also Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism:
The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 562 (1999) (discussing strategy that
invokes "building new international norms and enforcement mechanisms through treaty
agreements").
3. See Warneck, supra note I, at 178.
4. Id. at 178-79; see also Wedgwood, supra note 2, at 560, 563.
5. See Munir Ahmed, Bin Laden Moved After Attack, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 14, 2001; A
Verdict Against Terrorism, WASH. POST, May 30, 2001, at A18; The Embassy Bombings Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2001, at A18.
6. Michael Grumwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Hit
Pentagon; Hundreds Dead; Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put on Highest Alert, WASH.
POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
7. It has been reported that under this new campaign, the government will target terrorists involved in prior attacks on America such as, for example, the bombing of the Kobar Towers military barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996. See Rowan Scarborough, U.S. Plans War on Terrorists,
Not Infrastructure, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A13. In June 2001, in connection with that
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attacks launched against the United States" 8 and providing $40 billion to
help cover the cost of rebuilding and military action. 9 On September 20,
2001, in an address to the nation, President George W. Bush announced the
creation of a new office reporting directly to him-the Office of Homeland
Security.10 On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed the "USA Patriot
Act of 2001" into law," legislation intended to assist authorities in tracking
and disrupting the activities of suspected terrorists in the United States.' 2
The government also undertook a concerted diplomatic effort to enlist
the cooperation and support of other countries in responding to the terrorist
attacks.13 On January 29, 2002, in his first State of the Union address,
President Bush expanded the scope of the campaign to include "preventing
'the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons from threatening the United States and the world."' 14 In March
2002, President Bush asked Congress for an additional $27.1 billion for

bombing, a forty-six count indictment was returned against thirteen members of the pro-Iranian
Saudi Hizballah or "Party of God" in the Eastern District of Virginia charging, in part, conspiracy
to kill Americans and employees of the United States, to use weapons of mass destruction, and to
destroy United States property. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Khobar Towers Release
availableat http://www.fbi.gov/ (June 21, 2001).
8. Text of Joint Resolution, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2001, at A4; Neil A. Lewis, Measure
Backing Bush's Use of Force is as Broad as a Declarationof War, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2001, at B7.
9. John Lancaster & Helen Dewar, Congress Clears Use of Force, $40 Billion in Emergency
Aid, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2001, at A4.
10. PresidentBush's Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2001, at B4 [hereinafter Bush's Address on Terrorism]. Former Pennsylvania Governor
Tom Ridge was chosen to head the new office. Christopher Marquis, Bush Chooses Old Ally for
Cabinet-Level Post, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2001, at B5. On October 8, 2001, Ridge was sworn in
as director of the Office of Homeland Security. Eric Pianin, Ridge Assumes Post Amid Warnings
of Possible Attacks, FBI Warns Public, Private Entities to Observe "Highest State of Alert,"
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2001, at A6.
11. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2002).
12. See Jonathan Krim & Robert O'Harrow Jr., Bush Signs into Law New Enforcement Era,
WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at A6.
13. Karen DeYoung, Bush Urges Coalition to Fulfill Its 'Duties'; $1 Billion Aid for Pakistan
Announced, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2001, at Al; David E. Sanger & Michael R. Gordon, A Nation
Challenged; The White House; U.S. Takes Steps to Bolster Bloc Fighting Terror,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2001, at AI; Brent Scowcroft, Build a Coalition, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2001, at A23;
Jane Perlez, A Nation Challenged: Europeans; Blair and Chirac Head to U.S. for Talks and a
Show of Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at B2; Ben Barber, Powell Sets Up Global Anti-Terror
Coalition U.S. Eyes Strikes at TrainingCamps, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at Al.
14. See William Kristok, Taking the War Beyond Terrorism, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2002, at
A25; see also Charles Krauthammer, Redefining the War, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2002 (noting that
President Bush's State of the Union address will be remembered because "[ilt redefined the war");
Amy Goldstein & Mike Allen, Bush Vows to Defeat Terror, Recession, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,
2002, at AI (noting that President Bush had "laid out a justification for a longer and broader war
against terrorism" and identified North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as representing "'an axis of evil' ..
attempting to develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons").
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3

domestic security and military needs stemming from the attacks on
September 11.15
While the long-term campaign1 6 against terrorism will continue to have
a criminal law component,17 it is likely to be more carefully scrutinized than
it was in the past' 8 and be part of a broader diplomatic, intelligence,

15. Dana Millbank, Bush Seeks $27.1 Billion More for Military, Security, Relief Efforts,
WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2002, at AT.
16. In his address to the joint session of Congress following the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, President Bush stated in part:
Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes.
Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we
have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and covert operations,
secret even in success.
We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from
place to place until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that
provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.
Bush's Address on Terrorism, supra note 10, at B4; see also Goldstein & Allen, supra note 14, at
Al (reporting that in his first State of the Union address, President Bush stated "Our war on
terrorism is well begun, but it is only begun, [Bush said.] This campaign may not be finished on
our watch, yet it must be and it will be waged on our watch."); Mike Allen, Bush: War May Last
Over 2 Years; President Says He's Ready to Accept Political Consequences, WASH. POST, Oct.
18, 2001, at A29 (reporting that President Bush indicated "he expects his war on terrorism to take
more than two years and that he is ready to accept the political consequences if the nation tires of
the fight").
17. See Dan Eggen & Karen DeYoung, FBI Draws 'The Line' with Names and Faces,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2001, at A16 (reporting the unveiling of a list of "Most Wanted Terrorists"
supplementing the FBI's popular "10 Most Wanted"); see also David Johnston & Benjamin
Weiser, Ashcroft Is Centralizing Control Over the Prosecution and Prevention of Terrorism, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2001, at B9 (discussing establishment of "9/11 Task Force" within the
Department of Justice "to operate as the agency's central command structure for prosecuting terror
cases and helping to prevent further acts of violence against the United States"); Jim Oliphant,
Bush's Burden: Seeking Justice in Terror's Wake, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 17, 2001, at 12 (stating
"[u]ltimately, it is likely that an extensive military campaign will exist side by side with a
domestic prosecutorial effort").
18. See Rush Limbaugh, Bush's FDR Example, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2001, at A35 (arguing that if al Qaeda terrorists were prosecuted in civilian courts as opposed to military tribunals,
the "government would be required to reveal secret intelligence information and techniques in
open court, and our courtrooms would most likely be turned into forums for propagandizing and
encouraging further terrorist acts"); see also William Glaberson, U.S. Faces Tough Choices if Bin
Laden is Captured, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at B5 (noting that trial of Osama bin Laden in
federal court "would present problems. Among other things, American courts give defendants
access to much of the government's evidence against them. A federal court trial could provide
terrorists with a road map to the country's intelligence sources ... giving them an advantage in the
continuing battle against terrorism."); Karen De Young & Michael Dobbs, Bin Laden: Architect
of New Global Terrorism, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2001, at A8 (discussing in part how prosecution
of terrorists enables terrorist organizations to learn how authorities investigate and pursue organization when evidence related to those questions is presented in open court); John Lancaster &
Susan Schmidt, U.S. Rethinks Strategy for Coping with Terrorists; Policy Shift Would Favor
Military Action, Tribunal Over Pursuing Suspects Through American Courts, WASH. POST, Sept.
14, 2001, at A9 ("Stunned by the magnitude of... terrorist attacks, Congress and the White
House are reassessing an approach to fighting terrorism that ... has favored the tools of law
enforcement over those of war.").
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economic, and military effort.19 It has been suggested that, historically,
criminal law has focused on the third method of combating terrorismresponding to the terrorist attack after it occurs.2 0 Whether or not this is
accurate, this much is now clear. On September 18, 2001, as part of the
counter-terrorism strategy in response to the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, Attorney General John D. Ashcroft announced
that every United States Attorney had been directed to establish an antiterrorism task force in his or her district; these task forces would be "part of
a national network that [would] coordinate the dissemination of information
and the development of . . . strategy to disrupt, dismantle and punish terrorist organizations throughout the country." 21 Attorney General Ashcroft
stated that the creation and operation of these task forces "represent[ed] a
more preventative approach to doing business," a change in mission
brought about by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 22
One aspect of the aftermath of these devastating attacks was the
renewed recognition 23 that funding plays an important role in the activities
of international terrorists. 24 Indeed, almost two weeks after the attacks,
President Bush entered an executive order directing financial institutions to

19. See Bob Woodward, 50 Countries Detain 360 Suspects at CIA's Behest; Roundup
Reflects Aggressive Efforts of an Intelligence Coalition Viewed as Key to War on Terrorism,
WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2001, at AI (reporting that a "senior White House official said ... the
intelligence coalition is as important as the military and diplomatic coalitions involved in the war
on terrorism"); see also Steven Mufson & Alan Sipress, Bush to Seek Nation's Support Tonight;
First Warplanes Head to TargetedArea; Battle Called 'A War of Will and Mind,' WASH. POST,
Sept. 20, 2001, at Al ("Bush and senior administration officials spent another day lining up
international support for military, financial and economic actions that the president said would be
designed to locate terrorist leaders, 'get them out of their caves, get them moving, cut off their
finances."').
20. See Warneck, supra note 1, at 179.
21. Press Briefing, FBI Headquarters, Attorney General Remarks 2 (Sept. 18, 2001)
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/0918pressbriefing.htm (last visited 4/10/02).
22. Id. at 3.; see also Dan Eggen & Jim McGee, FBI Rushes to Remake Its Mission; Counterterrorism Focus Replaces Crime Solving, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2001 (reporting that "[s]ince the
Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and his handpicked FBI director,
Robert S. Mueller III, have begun to refocus the Bureau's efforts on detecting and thwarting future
terrorist assaults, instead of pursuing culprits after crimes are committed"); Council to Coordinate
Anti-Terror Efforts, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Mar. 6, 2002 (reporting the creation of National Security Coordination Council at the Department of Justice to coordinate the fight against terrorism).
23. Prior to the September 11 attacks, the government froze the assets of certain terrorist
organizations in an effort to disrupt their operations. Wedgwood, supra note 2, at 562. For
example, following the attacks of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salam, "an
executive order froze the U.S. assets of bin Laden and forbade any financial transactions between
U.S. companies and his associates." Id. at 562-63 (citation omitted).
24. Paul Blustein, New Task Forces Target TerroristFunding; Money Laundering Studied;
Groups May Have Tried to Profit From Attacks, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A6; Kevin
McCoy, Feds Probe Whether Islamic CharitiesLinked to Hijackers, USA TODAY, Sept. 20, 2001,
at A3.
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freeze any assets belonging to fifteen organizations and twelve individuals
25
suspected of funding terrorists.
One existing tool aimed at curtailing the funding of international
terrorist activity is found in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA" or the "Act"), which was signed into law by President
Clinton on April 24, 1996.26 The purpose of the AEDPA, described by
some commentators as a first-stage preemptive approach to combating terrorism,27 was in part, as the name implies, to "deter terrorism." 28 Under the
international terrorist prohibitions of the Act, the Secretary of State has the
authority to designate an entity as a foreign terrorist organization, thereby
effectively freezing its assets and rendering the provision of any material
29
support to that organization subject to criminal prosecution.
The enforcement of the international terrorist prohibitions of the
AEDPA raises a number of questions. For example, what procedural due
process concerns are implicated by the Secretary of State's designation of a
terrorist organization? Are all of the findings associated with the designation of an entity as a foreign terrorist organization subject to judicial
review? Do the anti-fundraising provisions of the Act violate the First
Amendment? Are they constitutionally overbroad? This article discusses
the answers to these questions and provides a general overview of the
developing case law on those sections of the AEDPA related to these topics.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
PROHIBITIONS OF THE AEDPA

The antiterrorism provisions of the AEDPA were designed to "provide
the Federal Government the fullest possible basis, consistent with the Constitution, to prevent persons within the United States, or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, from providing material support or resources to

25. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001); see also Mike Allen &
Paul Blustein, Bush Moves to Cut Terrorists' Support; Foreign Banks Urged to Help Freeze
Assets of 27 Entities, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at Al; John Mintz & David Hilzenrath, Bush's
Target List Draws Path to Bin Laden's Backers, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at A9.
26. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214; see also Robert Plotkin, First Amendment Challenges to the Membership and Advocacy
Provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.

623, 624-25 (1996) (discussing the legislative evolution of the AEDPA).
27. See Warneck, supra note 1, at 179.
28. 110 Stat. 1214. The AEDPA is composed of nine titles and covers areas such as justice
for victims, habeas corpus reform, international terrorism prohibitions, nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons restrictions, implementation of plastic explosives convention, terrorist and
criminal alien removal and exclusion, criminal-law modifications to counter terrorism, and
assistance to law enforcement. 110 Stat. 1214-17.
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2000).
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foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities." 30 Under the
AEDPA, the Secretary of State ("Secretary"), in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, may
designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization ...

if

the Secretary finds that (A) the organization is a foreign organization; (B) the organization engages in terrorist activity 31

. .

. ; and

(C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security
of United States nationals or the national security 32 of the United
States.

33

In making this determination, the Secretary may rely upon classified
information.

34

The consequences of designation are significant. Upon notification by
the Secretary to members of Congress of an intended designation, 35 the
Secretary of Treasury may freeze any assets 36 that the organization has on
deposit with any financial institution 37 in the United States. 38 These assets

30. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000) (quoting Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)
& (b), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247).
31. Generally, "terrorist activity" includes the following acts, or the threat, attempt or conspiracy to engage in the same: (i) hijacking or sabotaging an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle; (ii) seizing, detaining, or threatening to kill an individual in order to compel a third person (including a
government organization) to do or abstain from doing an act; (iii) attacking an internationally
protected person; (iv) engaging in an assassination; and (v) using biological or chemical agents,
nuclear weapons, explosives, or firearms with the intent to endanger others or damage property. 8
U.S.C. § II 82(a)(3)(B)(ii)(I)-(V) (2000).
32. "National security" is defined as "the national defense, foreign relations, or economic
interests of the United States." Id. § 1 189(c)(2).
33. Id. § 11 89(a)(1) & (c)(4). "While this definition does not specifically address the issue of
multifaceted organizations, it appears that if an organization engages in any form of terrorism, it
will be considered terrorist regardless of the other functions the group may perform." Jacqueline
Benson, Comment, Send Me Your Money: Controlling InternationalTerrorism by Restricting
Fundraisingin the United States, 21 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 321, 343 (1988).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1 189(a)(3)(B). This subsection states:
The Secretary may consider classified information in making a designation under this
subsection. Classified information shall not be subject to disclosure for such time as it
remains classified, except that such information may be disclosed to a court ex parte
and in camera for purposes of judicial review under subsection (b) [of this section].
Id.
35. Seven days prior to designating an entity as a foreign terrorist organization, the Secretary
must, by "classified communication," notify selected members of Congress and of particular
committees of the contemplated designation. Id. § 11 89(a)(2)(A)(i). Seven days after the notification, the Secretary must publish the designation in the Federal Register. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii).
The designation takes effect upon publication. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(B)(i).
36. See 31 C.F.R. § 597.302 (2001) (defining assets).
37. See 31 C.F.R. § 597.319(a) (2001) (defining "U.S. financial institution" in part as "[a]ny
financial institution organized under the laws of the United States, including such financial
institution's foreign branches").
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(A)-(C); see also 31 C.F.R. § 597.201(a) (2001); see generally, 31
C.F.R. § 597.309 (2001) (defining foreign terrorist organization as "an organization designated or
redesignated as a foreign terrorist organization, or with respect to which the Secretary of State has
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remain frozen "until further directive from either the Secretary of the
Treasury, Act of Congress, or order of court." 39 Furthermore, any financial
institution that becomes aware it holds assets belonging to a foreign terrorist
organization or its agent 40 must freeze that account and report its existence
4
to the Secretary of the Treasury. 1
Members of a designated organization and its representatives also are
barred from entering the United States. 42 More significantly, anyone subject to or within the jurisdiction of the United States who "knowingly
provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or
attempts or conspires to do so" may be criminally prosecuted. 43 The Act
defines "material support or resources" as "currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert
advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine
or religious materials."44
The Secretary's designation is effective for two years.45 Prior to the
termination of the two-year period, the Secretary may redesignate an
organization as a foreign terrorist organization, provided that the relevant
circumstances that led to the initial designation still exist.46 Congress may
block or revoke a designation. 47 The Secretary also may revoke a

notified Congress of the intention to designate as a foreign terrorist organization, under 8 U.S.C. §
1189(a)") (emphasis added).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a)(2)(C); see also 31 C.F.R. § 597.201(b).
40. See 31 C.F.R. § 597.301 (2001) (defining agent).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2) (2000). A financial institution's failure to retain possession of
such funds may result in the imposition of civil penalties and injunctive relief. Id. § 2339B(b) &
(c).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A) (2000).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l), as amended by § 810(d) of the USA Patriot Act of 2001,
provides:
Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or
attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 15 years, or both, and, if death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any
term of years [or for] life.
Id. The provision of material support or resources to a terrorist organization is also now a predicate offense to money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000) (§ 805(b) of the USA Patriot
Act).
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b) & 2339B(g)(4) (as amended by § 805 (b) of the USA Patriot Act
of 2001).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1 189(a)(4)(A) (2000).
46. Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B).
47. Id. § 1189(a)(5).
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designation if changed circumstances or the national security of the United
States warrant the change.4 8
On October 2, 1997, then Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright
made the first set of designations under the Act, identifying thirty organizations as foreign terrorist organizations.4 9 On October 8, 1999, Secretary
Albright redesignated twenty-seven groups50 and added al-Qa'ida, the
terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden associated with the attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.S1 On September 25, 2000,
Secretary Albright designated one organization.52
The Bush Administration also has been involved in the designation
process under the Act. On October 5, 2001, Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell renewed the designation of twenty-four organizations and added one
new organization to the list. 53 More recently, on December 26, 2001 and
March 27, 2002, Secretary Powell designated five additional groups as
terrorist organizations, including two Pakistani groups and a group linked to
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's party.5 4
The Secretary's designations of organizations have included aliases. 55
While the statute does not expressly allow for an alias designation, one
court has recognized that the Secretary's "power to designate an

48. Id. § 1189(a)(6)(A)(i)-(ii).
49. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650-51 (Oct. 8,
1997).
50. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112, 55,112-13 (Oct. 8,
1999). Three groups designated in 1997 were allowed to lapse.
51. See T.R. Reid, Tape Proves Bin Laden is Guilty, Britain Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 15,
2001, at A29 (reporting that according to the British government, "[i]n a videotape made [on Oct.
20], Osama bin Laden declared that his al Qaeda network 'instigated' the Sept. 11 attacks"); see
also Dan Eggen & Vernon Loeb, U.S. Has Strong Evidence of Bin Laden Link to Attack, WASH.
POST, Sept. 12, 2001 (reporting that "[aiccording to the [U.S.] State Department's April 2001
report on global terrorism, bin Laden uses a $300 million family inheritance to finance his terrorist
organization, al Qaeda, which has 'several hundred to several thousand members' and a
'worldwide reach"').
52. Designation of a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 65 Fed. Reg. 57,641, 57,641-44 (Sept.
25,2000).
53. Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,088, 51,088-90 (Oct. 5,
2001); see also Steven Mufson, U.S. Updates List of Terrorist Groups, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2001.
54. Press Release, Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, Statement on Designation of Three
Additional Terrorist Organizations (Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/
rmI2002/9017.htm; see also Alan Sipress, U.S. Lists Bomber's Group as Terrorist, Freezes Assets,
WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2002, at A18; Peter Slevin, Pakistan Groups Called Terrorist Organizations; Powell Names 2 in Formal Declaration,WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2001, at A20.
55. For example, the Secretary's designation of "al Qa'ida" on October 8, 1999, provided
that it was also known as al Qaeda, the Base, the Islamic Army, the World Islamic Front for Jihad
Against Jews and Crusaders, the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, the Usama
Bin Laden Network, Islamic Salvation Foundation, and the Group for the Preservation of the Holy
Sites. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112, 55,112 (Oct. 8,
1999); see also A Look at Groups Linked to Osama Bin Laden, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 20,
2001.
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organization as a foreign terrorist organization if it commits the necessary
sort of terrorist acts under its own name implies the authority to so designate an entity that commits the necessary terrorist acts under some other
name."

56

An entity designated as a foreign terrorist organization may seek
judicial review of such designation within thirty days of publication in the
Federal Register with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.57 The judicial review is to be "based solely upon the
administrative record, except that the Government may submit, for ex parte
and in camera review, classified information used in making the designation." 58 The court must set aside a designation if it finds the designation
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right; (D) lacking
substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or
in classified information submitted to the court. .. or (E) not in
accord with the procedures required by law. 59
I1.THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S DESIGNATION AND
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
As a preliminary matter, it bears noting that courts have held that the
AEDPA does not give the Secretary the "unfettered discretion," in violation
of the First and Fifth Amendments, to designate groups as foreign terrorist
organizations. 60 As explained by the court in HumanitarianLaw Project v.
61

Reno:

56. Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1) (2000).
58. Id. § 1189(b)(2). "Because nothing in the legislation restricts the Secretary from acting
on the basis of third hand accounts, press stories, material on the Internet or other hearsay regarding the organization's activities, the 'administrative record' may consist of little else." People's
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1104 (2001).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1 189(b)(3)(A)-(E). "The pendency of an action for judicial review of a designation [does] not affect the application of ...section [1189], unless the court issues a final order
setting aside the designation." Id. § 1189(b)(4).
60. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 904 (2001). But see Jennifer A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L. J. 693, 704-05
(1998) (arguing the designation provision is problematic, notwithstanding the requirement that the
organization engage in terrorist activities, because "an entire group of people might be officially
classified as a 'terrorist organization' based upon no more than one unlawful act committed by
one of its members").
61. 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 904 (2001).
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The statute authorizes the Secretary to designate only those groups
that engage in terrorist activities. This standard is not so vague or
indeterminate as to give the Secretary unfettered discretion. For
example, the Secretary could not, under this standard, designate
the International Red Cross or the International Olympic Committee as terrorist organizations. Rather, the Secretary must have
reasonable grounds to believe that an organization has engaged in
terrorist acts-assassinations, bombings, hostage-taking, and the
like-before she can place it on the list. This standard is
62
sufficiently precise to satisfy constitutional concerns.
Moreover, because the conduct involves foreign affairs, the executive
63
branch is entitled to more latitude than in the domestic context.
The designation process under the AEDPA occurs without any prior
notice or hearing. 64 The only notice provided under the Act occurs after the
designation is made public, and it only triggers an opportunity for judicial
review of an administrative record, which the aggrieved party has no
opportunity to add to or challenge. 65 Does such a procedure comport with
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process? 66 Currently, the answer
is no, assuming the foreign organization is eligible for constitutional
protection in the first place. 67
68
In National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State, two

organizations challenged their designation on the ground that by "designating them without notice or hearing as a foreign terrorist organization,
with the resultant interference with their rights to obtain and possess property and the rights of their members to enter the United States, the Secretary
deprived them of 'liberty, or property, without due process of law,' in

62. HumanitarianLaw Project, 205 F.3d at 1137 (citations omitted). One commentator has
observed that a major problem with the AEDPA "is deciding which groups qualify as terrorist
organizations. It is difficult to determine the primary function of organizations that focus on
political or religious issues but occasionally utilize terrorist tactics." Benson, supra note 33, at
342-43 (citations omitted).
63. HumanitarianLaw Project, 205 F.3d at 1137.
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2).
65. Id. § 1189(a)(8).
66. The Fifth Amendment provides in part that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Generally speaking, under the
dues process clause, "[i]f life, liberty or property is at stake, the individual has a right to a fair
procedure. The question then focuses on the nature of the 'process' that is 'due."' 3 RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOVAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 17.1, at 3 (3d ed. 1999).

67. See Andy Pearson, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A
Return to Guilt by Association, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1185, 1206-11 (1998) (arguing that
the process by which the Secretary designates an organization as a foreign terrorist organization
violates procedural due process).
68. 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution."69 The
court agreed. 70
The court began its analysis by noting that for an organization to avail
itself of constitutional protection, an organization designated as a foreign
terrorist organization must be able to establish a "constitutional presence in
the United States." 7' In this case, the court found that "the entire record
including the classified information" established that one of the organizations "c[ould] rightly lay claim to having come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with this country." 72
As described by the court (insofar as the non-classified information was
concerned), the connection to the United States at least consisted of the
organization's "overt presence within the National Press Building in
Washington, D.C.," and "an interest in a small bank account." 73 Furthermore, since the Secretary's designation of this organization was premised
on the theory that it was an alter ego of another organization, the other
organization likewise could claim protection. 74
In making the determination that the organizations were entitled to
constitutional protection, the court rejected the government's contention
that, as foreign government instrumentalities, the organizations were subject to interaction "not within the constitutional framework, but through the
system of international law and diplomacy." 75 The court explained:
It is certainly true that sovereign states interact with each other
through diplomacy and even coercion in ways not affected by constitutional protections such as the Due Process Clause. However,
since neither ...

[of the two organizations] is a government, none

69. Nat'l Council, 251 F.3d at 200.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 201. "A foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no
constitutional rights, under the due process clause or otherwise." People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran
v. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
72. Nat'l Council, 251 F.3d at 202. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261
(1990), the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to foreign searches
by American law enforcement officials involving property of non-resident aliens with "no voluntary connection" to the United States. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261. In support of its
connection or presence determination, the court in National Council explained that nothing in
Verdugo-Urquidez's holding "purport[ed] to establish whether aliens who have entered the territory of the United States and developed connections with this country but not substantial ones
are entitled to constitutional protections" and that it was "not undertaking to determine, as a
general matter, how 'substantial' an alien's connections with this country must be to merit the protections of the Due Process Clause or any other part of the Constitution." Nat'l Council, 251 F.3d
at 202.
73. Nat'l Council, 251 F.3d at 201. The court's reliance in National Council on classified
information in support of its presence ruling appears to leave little or no precedential value on this
question since there is no record of what the court considered.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 202.
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of the authorities offered by the Secretary have any force .... If
the United States were to recognize ... [one of the organizations]

as a government, or even perhaps to deal with it as if it were a
government, then the result might be different. But on the present
record, the Secretary has deemed the [organization] to be nothing
but a foreign terrorist organization, and it is as such that the
76
Secretary must litigate with that entity.
Having then determined that the organizations were entitled to protection
under the Fifth Amendment, the court next addressed whether the designation process and its consequences in fact deprived them of a liberty or
77
property interest, and if so, what process was due.
A.

THE DEPRIVATION OF A RECOGNIZED INTEREST

In assessing whether there had been a deprivation of a recognized
interest protected by the Due Process Clause, the court initially found that
78
the most obvious rights affected were the organizations' property rights.
The interest in a bank account by one of the organizations, the court
determined, raised at least a colorable allegation sufficient to support a due
79
process claim.

The court went on to recognize that plausible arguments were raised
by both parties as to whether the denial of readmission into the United
States to members of the organization who traveled abroad8 0 and the
criminal prohibition on the provision of resources or material support to the
organizations 81 affected liberty interests protected by the due process
76. Id. at 202-03.
77. See Pearson, supra note 67, at 1207 ("The first question under procedural due process
analysis is whether there has been a deprivation of liberty or property. When liberty or property
interests are at stake, the second question concerns the procedural protection necessary.")
(citations omitted).
78. Nat'l Council, 251 F.3d at 204. As noted by two distinguished commentators, "[c]ertainly all of the traditional forms of real and personal property fall within" the definition of "property"
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3 ROTUNDA & NOVAK, supra note 66, §
17.5, at 69.
79. Nat'l Council, 251 F.3d at 204 (relying on Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282
U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931) for the proposition that a foreign organization that acquires or holds
property in the United States may invoke the protections of the Constitution when that property is
placed in jeopardy by government intervention).
80. The Secretary maintained "with some convincing force that aliens have no right of entry
and that the organization ha[d] no standing to judicially assert rights which its members could not
bring to court." Nat'l Council, 251 F.3d at 204. For their part, the organizations argued that the
Act limited the "ability to travel abroad of its members who [we]re already in the United States as
they kn[e]w they would be denied readmission." Id.
81. Id. at 205. The organizations contended that the Act's ban on material support "deprive[d] their members of First Amendment associational and expressive rights." Id. The government responded that the ban did "not affect the ability of anyone to engage in advocacy of the
goals of the organizations, but only from providing material support which might likely be
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clause. 82 Having concluded previously that a property right was already
implicated, triggering due process protection, the court declined to rule on
8
the liberty interests which the organizations claimed also were affected. 3
B.

THE PROCESS DUE-WHEN AND WHAT

Well-established due process jurisprudence holds that before the
government can deprive a person of a protected property or liberty interest,
it must generally afford that person notice and an opportunity to be heard.8 4
This is not to say, however, that due process is "a technical concept with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." 85 To the contrary, "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
86
the particular situation demands."
In Mathews v. Eldridge,8 7 the Supreme Court identified three distinct
factors that must be considered when seeking to determine how much
procedural protection is required in a given context.88 The Court described
the factors as:
First, the private interest[s] that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
89
procedural requirement[s] would entail.

employed in the pursuit of unlawful terrorist purposes as [ilf First Amendment protected
advocacy." Id.
82. Id. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOVAK, supra note 66, § 17.4, at 28 (discussing deprivation of
liberty involving persons).
83. Nat'l Council, 251 F.3d at 205.
84. See, e.g., LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998) ("The core of due process is
the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard." (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985))).
85. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
86. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).
87. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
88. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
89. Id. at 335. In employing the Mathews balancing test, there are three procedural areas for
a court to consider:
First, a court should use the test to determine if an individual is entitled to a hearing
prior to (rather than after) a governmental action which would deprive him of a liberty
property interest...
Second, whether the court decides that a pre-deprivation or post-deprivation hearing is
required, it should employ the balancing test to determine the precise procedures to be
employed at the hearing. These balancing test rulings may cover the procedural
spectrum from requiring only informal hearings to requiring a full adversarial process.
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After applying those factors, the court in National Council ruled that the
"Secretary must afford the limited due process available to the putative
foreign terrorist organization prior to the deprivation worked by designating
that entity as such with its attendant consequences, unless he can make a
showing of particularized need." 90
As to what process is due, the court ruled that the "Secretary must
afford to the entit[y] under consideration notice that [a] designation is
impending." 91 This notice, the court explained, must provide the unclassified information upon which the Secretary intends to rely. 92 With respect
to the opportunity to be heard, the court rejected the suggestion that a
hearing similar to a trial was required. 93 What is required, the court determined, was "the opportunity to present, at least in written form, such
evidence as those entities may be able to produce to rebut the administrative
record or otherwise negate the proposition that they are foreign terrorist
organizations."94
In conclusion, following National Council, the Secretary must (absent
a showing of particularized need) afford notice to a terrorist organization,
which has a constitutional presence in the United States and is not recognized or treated as a de facto government, of an impending designation
so that the organization can have an opportunity to respond to the
nonclassified information upon which the Secretary intends to rely.

Third, if the court requires a formal adversarial process, it may use the balancing test
to determine the standard of proof that the government must meet in order to justify
the deprivation of the individual liberty or property interest in the individual case.
3 ROTUNDA & NOVAK, supra note 66, § 17.18, at 111-13.
90. Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added). The court recognized that "alerting a previously undesignated organization to
the impending designation as a foreign terrorist organization might work harm to th[e country's]
foreign policy goals in ways" that may not immediately be apparent; the court made clear that its
ruling was not intended to "foreclose the possibility of the Secretary, in an appropriate case,
demonstrating the necessity of withholding all notice and all opportunity to present evidence until
the designation is already made." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 209. The court indicated in National Council:
The notice must include the action sought, but need not disclose the classified information to be presented in camera and ex parte to the court under the statute. ... However, the Secretary has shown no reason not to offer the designated entities notice of
the administrative record which will in any event be filed publicly, at the very latest at
the time of the court's review.
Id. at 208-09.
93. Id. at 209 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
94. Id.
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE SECRETARY'S FINDINGS
As previously noted, under the AEDPA, the Secretary may designate
an organization as a foreign terrorist organization if he finds that "(A) the
organization is a foreign organization; (B) the organization engages in
terrorist activity ...and (C) the terrorist activity.., of the organization

threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of
the United States." 95 The AEDPA further provides for judicial review of a
designation if a petition is filed within thirty days of the publication of the
designation in the Federal Register. 96 But, all three of the Secretary's
findings are not subject to judicial review.
In People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States Depart-

ment of State,97 the court was confronted with petitions for review filed by
two organizations which had been designated as foreign terrorist organizations under the Act. 98 The court ruled that there was substantial support
in the record for the Secretary's determination that both organizations were
foreign organizations engaged in terrorist activities-the first two findings
under the AEDPA.99 As to the Secretary's finding that the organizations
were a threat to national security, the court, relying on Chicago & Southern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,oo ruled that this determina-

tion represented a political foreign policy decision, one "'for which the
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and [which] h[as]
long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to
judicial intrusion or inquiry."'

10

1

In Waterman, the Supreme Court confronted the propriety of judicial
review of orders emanating from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) which
operated to "grant or deny applications by citizen carriers to engage in
overseas and foreign air transportation

. . .

subject to the approval of the

President." 02 In ruling that such orders were not subject to judicial review,
even if issued prior to any presidential action, the Supreme Court observed
that the review of "an administrative decision which has only the force of a
recommendation to the President would be to render an advisory opinion in

95. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2000); see also Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to InternationalLaw-U.S. Designation of Foreign TerroristOrganization,
94 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 365 (2000).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1 189(b)(1).
97. 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
98. People'sMojaheden, 182 F.3d at 18.
99. Id. at 24-25.
100. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
101. People'sMojahedin, 182 F.3d at 23 (quoting Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111).
102. Waterman, 333 U.S. at 104.
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its most obnoxious form-advice that the President has not asked. .. on a
subject concededly within the President's exclusive, ultimate control."1 03
In the case involving the organizations, the court reasoned that the
admonition in Waterman regarding advisory opinions did not preclude
meaningful judicial review. As the court explained in People Mojahedin:
there is a difference between the statutory system in Waterman and
the statutory system we have before us ....

[In Waterman,] the

[CAB] order could not be effective without Presidential action....
Judicial review of the CAB's action, then, would have amounted
to rendering an advisory opinion. Not so here. If we were to
determine that the Secretary failed to comply, or did comply, with
Section 1189(a)(1)(A) and (B), there would be nothing advisory
about our opinion. We would uphold, or set aside, the Secretary's
determination on that ground. 104
In short, judicial review of a Secretary's designation under the AEDPA
appears to be limited to whether there is substantial support 05 in the record
for the finding that the organization is foreign and engages in terrorist
activity.106
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE AEDPA'S BAN ON
SUPPORT
The AEDPA has come under legal challenge by organizations and citizens who claim that criminalizing the provision of support directed to aid
only the legal and political activities of a designated organization infringes
on the First Amendment right of freedom of association. The courts have
rejected this contention.

103. Id. at 113.
104. People's Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 24.
105. Id. at 24-25. The court's refusal to review the Secretary's findings under something
more akin to the "substantial evidence" standard of the Administrative Procedure Act reflects a
recognition that the record compiled by the Secretary is not subject to any adversary, adjudicativetype process. Id. at 24 & n.8; see also Derek P. Jinks, Int'l Decision People's Mojahedin Org. of
Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17 U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, June 25, 1999, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 396, 398 n.33 (2000).
106. People's Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 25. One commentator has opined that "[this] compromise of limited judicial review demonstrates proper deference to the Supreme Court's holding
in Waterman and yet allows the court to perform the role Congress intended without entering the
political sphere." Michael J. Avenatti, D.C. Circuit Review, Judicial Review Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 803, 808 (2000). Another,
however, maintains that "in leaving the Secretary such broad and unfettered discretion in the factfinding process, the court effectively isolated the Secretary's actions" from judicialreview. Jinks,
supra note 105, at 399 (citations omitted).
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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The First Amendment provides in part that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech."1 07 Although the word "associa-

tion" is not found in the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that
"freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas
is an inseparable aspect of the liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech."O08 Put
another way, "an individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition
the government for redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected
from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed."1 09
B.

HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT V. RENO

In HumanitarianLaw Project v. Reno,o10 plaintiffs, six organizations

and two United States citizens, sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of the AEDPA's ban on support for designated terrorist organizations
on various First Amendment grounds.]" The district court denied the requested relief for the most part'12 and on appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. '13
The court began its analysis by rejecting the argument that the AEDPA
was unconstitutional because it imposed guilt by association. 14 The court
recognized'that under First Amendment jurisprudence, liability cannot be
imposed "by reason of association alone.""15 But the AEDPA, the court
107. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The full text of the First Amendment states: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
108. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
109. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
110. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
111. HumanitarianLaw Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1180, 1184-85.
112. Id. at 1204. The district court found that the AEDPA's prohibitions against providing
"personnel" and "training" were impermissibly vague and enjoined enforcement of those
provisions against plaintiffs and any of their members. Id. at 1205 n.31. See supra Part VI
(discussing this aspect of the court's ruling in more detail)
113. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 904 (2001).
114. Id.at1133.
115. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Corp., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982)). In
Claiborne Hardware, the Supreme Court held that the "right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of the group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected." Clairborne Hardware,458 U.S. at 908.
As a' result, following Claiborne Hardware, "a law may not punish association without more, but
it may proscribe association with an organization whose members strive to advance the group's
violent goals." Pearson, supra note 67, at 1204-05 (citations omitted); see also Scales v. United
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determined, does "not prohibit being a member of one of the designated
groups or vigorously promoting and supporting the political goals of the
group."1 6 Rather, as the court in HumanitarianLaw Project explained:
What AEDPA prohibits is the act of giving material support, and
there is no constitutional right to facilitate terrorism by giving
terrorists the weapons and explosives with which to carry out their
grisly missions. Nor, of course, is there a right to provide
resources with which terrorists can buy weapons and explosives. 17
As to the contention that the AEDPA was unconstitutional because it
proscribed the giving of support irrespective of the donor's intent,118 the
court observed that "[a]dvocacy is always protected under the First Amendment whereas making donations is protected only in certain contexts."119
Here, plaintiffs did "not contend they [welre prohibited from advocating the
goals of the foreign terrorist organizations, espousing their views, or even
being members of such groups."1 20 Material support, however, could be
"used to promote the organization's unlawful activities, regardless of donor
intent," and the court rejected the contention that the government was
required to demonstrate a specific intent to aid an organization's illegal
activities before attaching liability to the donation of funds.121
In response to the argument that terrorist organizations also engaged in
political advocacy and that the provisions of moneys to such organizations
reflected political association and expression, the court recognized that
States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (finding membership in a group may be punished if the government can demonstrate that the person is actively involved with group, knows of its illegal
activities, and has intent to further those objectives).
116. HumanitarianLaw Project,205 F.3d at 1133.
117. Id.
118. See id.; see also Beall, supra note 60, at 699 (noting that an American citizen, if convicted, may be imprisoned "for making political contributions, even if he is contributing only to
the legal, peaceful activities of the organization. There is absolutely no requirement that the
government prove an individual had the specific intent to advance the illegal aims of the group
through [the] contribution.").
119. HumanitarianLaw Project,205 F.3d at 1134.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1133-34. The court in HumanitarianLaw Project recognized that in AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995) (ADC I),a panel of the
court ruled that, in order to punish advocacy, "the government must establish a 'knowing
affiliation' and a 'specific intent to further those illegal aims."' Id. at 1063 (quoting Healey v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972)). The HumanitarianLaw Project court distinguished ADC I on
the ground that "advocacy is far different from making donations of material support."
Humaniiarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134. Furthermore, although the same panel of the court
in American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm. v. Reno, 119 F.3d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1999),
vacated 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (ADC II), had noted that the associational activities of the plaintiffs
in ADC I included fundraising, the court in Humanitarian Law Projectfound that ADC H had
been vacated; also, there had been "no language in ADC I holding that fundraising enjoy[ed] First
Amendment protection on a par with pure speech or advocacy." HumanitarianLaw Project, 205
F.3d at 1134.
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there were cases such Buckley v. Valeo,122 where the contributions were
made to candidates running for political office in order to assist them to
engage in electioneering.1 23 However, the court reasoned, "[w]hile the First
Amendment protects the expressive component of seeking and donating
funds, expressive conduct receives significantly less protection than pure
speech."' 24 And where, as in the case of the AEDPA, the prohibition
''serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression," intermediate
scrutiny is the governing standard. 125
The test under this standard is set forth in United States v. O'Brien,126
where the Supreme Court ruled that a content neutral regulation may be
justified:
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on the alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
127

furtherance of that interest.
The court in HumanitarianLaw Project answered all of these questions in
2
the affirmative. 1 8
First, the court found that the federal government clearly has the power
to enact laws that restrict dealings between United States citizens and
foreign entities.1 29 Second, the court determined there was no doubt that
preventing the spread of international terrorism furthered an important and
substantial government interest.130 As to the third factor-whether the
interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression-the court
conclded that such was the case because the ban restricted "the actions of

122. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
123. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12-13.
124. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134-35 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 406 (1989)).
125. Id. at 1135 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)); see also
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (stating when government's regulation is
unrelated to the suppression of a particular message or idea, it is content neutral and subject to
intermediate level of scrutiny). The court observed in HumanitarianLaw Project that the restriction was not "aimed at interfering with the expressive component of [the organizations'] conduct
but at stopping aid to terrorist groups." HumanitarianLaw Project,205 F.3d at 1135.
126. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
127. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
128. HumanitarianLaw Project,205 F.3d at 1135.
129. See id. (citing Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 224 (1984) and adding a parenthetical,
"restrictions on travel to Cuba do not violate the Fifth Amendment").
130. Id.
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those who wish to give material support to the groups, not the expression of
those who advocate or believe the ideas that the group supports."131
Finally, the court found that the ban was "well enough tailored to its
end of preventing the United States from being used as a base for terrorist
fundraising."132 The court noted that "Congress explicitly incorporated a
finding into the statute that 'foreign organizations [that] engage in terrorist
activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to
such an organization facilitates that conduct." ' 133 Consequently, it "follow[ed] that all material support given to such organizations aids their unlawful goals," and it could not be said the Congress could not properly have
34
come to that conclusion.1
Notwithstanding the concern raised by some commentators that the
anti-funding provisions of the AEDPA violate the First Amendment's
guarantees of free speech and association, 135 the only court that has
squarely confronted this issue has found otherwise.136 In light of the recent
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the favorable case
law, it would be surprising if the government did not become more
aggressive in its enforcement of the anti-funding provisions of the AEDPA.
VI. THE AEDPA AND VAGUENESS
A criminal law such as § 2339B(a) must be sufficiently clear so that a
person of common intelligence does not have to guess at its meaning to
determine what is proscribed.137 At least three rationales compel special
strictness when reviewing laws for vagueness that impact on constitutional
rights such as freedom of association or freedom of speech. 38 First, the
requirement that a law put persons on notice as to what is criminal "is of
special importance when the activity distinguishes between criminal

131. Id.; see also Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 2074, 2091 (1996) (arguing the Act regulates conduct not speech); William Patton, Note,
Preventing Terrorist Fundraisingin the United States, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 127,
149 (1996) ("Preventing the spread of terrorism at home and abroad is clearly an important
government interest that bears no relation to the suppression of freedom of expression."). But see
Beall, supra note 60, at 702-03 (arguing the contrary).
132. HumanitarianLaw Project,205 F.3d at 1136.
133. Id. (quoting AEDPA § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996)).
134. Id. (citations omitted).
135. See, e.g., Beall, supra note 60, at 702-05; Pearson, supra note 67, at 1211-15; Gregory
C. Clark, Note, History Repeating Itself: The (D)Evolution of Recent British and American
Antiterrorism Legislation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 276-77 (1999).
136. HumanitarianLaw Project,205 F.3d at 1134-36.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954) (stating the statute will be
void for vagueness if it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute").
138. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
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activity and activity that constitutes a fundamental constitutional right."139
Second, unless law enforcement officers have distinct guidelines, they
would be able to enforce the statute selectively. 140 Finally, "because the
First Amendment needs breathing space, the governmental regulation that is
tolerated must be drawn with 'narrow specificity.""41
In HumanitarianLaw Project, plaintiffs argued that the AEDPA was
impermissibly vague because it failed to provide adequate notice as to what
constituted "material support and resources." 42 The district court agreed
that two of the terms defining support-"training" and "personnel"-were
impermissibly vague and enjoined the prosecution of any of plaintiffs'
members for activities covered by those terms. 143
In affirming the ruling below, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit found that "[s]omeone who advocat[ed] the cause of the
[designated organization] could be seen as supplying them with personnel,"
yet "advocacy [was] pure speech protected by the First Amendment."'44
Similarly, the term "training" fared little better since someone who was
interested in teaching "members of a designated group on how to petition
the United Nations to give aid to their group could plausibly decide that
such protected expression falls within the scope of the term 'training."1 45
As noted previously, the AEDPA defines "material support or resources" as "currency or monetary instruments or financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses,
false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other
physical assets, except medicine or religious materials." 46 The court's
ruling in HumanitarianLaw Project with respect to two of the terms under
that definition by no means signals the death knell of the prohibition against
the provision of material support to terrorist organizations.

139. 4 ROTUNDA & NOVAK, supra note 66, § 20.9, at 274; see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 391 (1979).
140. 4 ROTUNDA & NOVAK, supra note 66, § 20.9, at 275.; see also Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
141. 4 ROTUNDA & NOVAK, supra note 66, § 20.9, at 275 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 433 (1963)); see also Grayned v. City of Redford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
142. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
143. Id. at 1203-04.
144. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000).
145. Id.
146. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b) & 2339B(g)(4) (as amended by § 805(b) of the USA Patriot
Act of 2001).
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VII. CONCLUSION
America's criminal laws will continue to play a part in the government's protracted campaign to combat international terrorism. 147 Naturally,
some laws will have more of an impact than others. The AEDPA's provisions authorizing the Secretary to designate an organization as a foreign
terrorist organization, effectively freezing any assets the organization may
have in the United States and also rendering the provision of material support to that organization subject to criminal federal prosecution,148 provide
the government with another weapon in its battle against the eradication of
international terrorism.149

147. See Dana Milbank, For President, Reassuring a Jittery Nation, WASH. POST, Oct. 12,
2001, at A19 ("The defeat of al Qaeda 'may happen tomorrow, it may happen a month from now,
it may take a year or two,' [the President] said. 'But we will prevail."'); see also Powell Says
Going After Bin Laden is Only First Phase of U.S. Counterterrorism Campaign, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Oct. 4, 2001 ("Secretary of State Colin Powell said ... a prospective military strike in
Afghanistan against the al-Qaida terrorism network would be only the first step in the U.S. campaign against terrorism."); Walter Pincus, Committee: Terrorism Threat is Long Term, WASH.
POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A33 ("Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ... described international terrorism as a long-term threat and called on the U.S. intelligence community to avoid considering ... attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as 'a short-lived phenomenon."').
148. See Paul Nowell, Judge Allows Canadian Spy Evidence in Cigarette Smuggling Trial,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 2, 2002 (reporting on prosecution of four defendants for providing
material support to Hezbollah, a known terrorist organization); James Pierpoint, U.S. Seeks to Use
Canadian Wiretaps in Terror Case, REUTERS, Dec. 5, 2001 (identifying prosecution described in
article above as the "first to come to trial under a 1996 law that makes it illegal to aid foreign
groups designated by the U.S. government as terrorist organizations").
149. See Warneck, supra note 1, at 226-27; see also Patton, supra note 131, at 149.

